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Abstract
Japan's preponderant emphasis on the fastest possible improvement
of labor productivity in manufacturing, unless the world keeps absorbing
Japanese exports at an increasing rate, may well reduce Japan's own
overall economic growth by shifting labor from high-productivity
manufacturing to low-productivity sectors. The first part of this paper
presents statistics to indicate where Japan stands relative to the U.S.
by real income and labor productivity. The second part examines employ-
ment adjustment in Japanese manufacturing and suggests that Japan's
success in the reduction of manufacturing employment has been due to the
weakness of job security, almost ruthless managerial rationality combined
with superb techniques of conflict minimization, understanding responses
of labor unions, and workers' own work-biased work-leisure preference
functions.

Economic growth and productivity growth
Table assembles some comparative statistics on the growth of
real income and labor productivity useful for assessing the relative
standing of the U.S. and Japan.
(Table about here)
What is interesting as revealed by the columns of GNP growth rates
is that after the flare-up of the Japanese GNP growth rate in 1972, which
was a relatively peaceful year between the Nixon Shock of 1971 and the
OPEC Shock of 1973, Japanese economic growth has slowed to low rates,
which for two consecutive years of 1976 and 1977 even fell below the U.S.
growth rates. It is generally believed that with the OPEC Shock Japan
entered a new era of slow growth. Statistical data seem to bear that
out. The second OPEC Shock stretched out from early 1979 to the end
of 1980, doubling the crude oil prices over the period. Japan managed
this crisis much better than the earlier one and certainly much better
than the U.S. did. The important lesson, however, is that other
things (especially economic policy) being the same, there is no reason
why the U.S. cannot attain the rate of economic growth equal to
Japan's in the world of the 1980s. Potential growth rates are pro-
bably similar in Japan and the U.S. now. But the greater likelihood
of policy mistakes in the U.S. may translate the same potential into
poorer performance.
The column of Japan's per capita output relative to that of the
U.S. shows that there still Is a considerable difference between Japan
and the U.S. The relativity may be subject to some inherent bias due
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to the particular method of estimation and comparison used by the
authors. At present, we do not know whether the bias exists at all or
whether, if it does, it works against the U.S. or Japan. Japan's per
capita output at about 60 percent of that of the U.S. in the early
1970s seems intuitively acceptable. The figure shown for 1980 in
parentheses is obtained by applying to the 1970 figure the relative
index of real GNP per capita reported for Japan and the U.S. (index of
real GNP per capita for Japan divided by the index of real GNP per
capita for the U.S.). For 1980, Japan's per capita output comes to be
more than 30 percent below that of the U.S. This difference seems
reasonable in the light of other numbers shown in Table 0.
The rest of Table refers to manufacturing, except for the last
column labelled "all industries." All of these relative estimates are
full of technical and conceptual problems. They should be taken only
as illustrative, although better estimates are not available.
Surprisingly, however, they seem to show a degree of consistency among
them, indicating that they must be measuring the same thing—labor
productivity in manufacturing. A systematic bias in favor of Japan is
endemic to the method used here—matching of comparable industries
which leaves out industries which exist in one country but do not in
another or industries whose products are not measured in common units.
Also, the weights of the "matched industries" are different between
countries. The original estimate by Kenzo Yukizawa for 1967 on which
the Labor Department adjustments were grafted is appraised to cover 25
percent of U.S. gross value added and 32 percent of Japanese net value
added in manufacturing, as well as 21 percent of U.S. employment and
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24 percent of Japanese employment In manufacturing. This gives rise
to the question of representativeness of the industries covered for
international comparison and to the impression that the estimate
covers a higher proportion of relatively efficient industries in Japan
2
than in the United States. But there is no way of adjusting for this
bias. One can merely say that Japanese productivity may not be really
as high as the figures suggest. The figures in parentheses for 1979
were extensions of earlier indices by relative indices of productivity
from another source as indicated in the notes to the table. It is
significant that by U.S. price weights, Japanese productivity had
caught up with American.
The estimate of Japan's physical labor productivity relative to
that of the U.S. for 1977 is done by Japan's Labor Ministry. This
covers products which are common to both countries and measured and
reported in physical units. The use of physical units seems to
restrict the scope of "matched industries." The number of production
workers in these industries, according to our own check on the basis
of censuses of manufactures is 15.1 percent of all production workers
in manufacturing for the U.S. and 16.2 percent for Japan. The value-
added productivity of the "matched industries" is roughly on a par
with that of all manufacturing in the U.S., but 22 percent higher than
that of all manufacturing in Japan. It appears therefore that the
Labor Ministry estimates results in a favorable showing for Japan than
would have been the case if all manufacturing had been covered
(although how this can be done is technically unsolvable as in the
case of the U.S. Labor Department work). Furthermore, it is generally
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believed that value added is a smaller proportion of the value of
shipments in Japan than in the U.S. Thus, the comaprison of physical
productivity would tend to favor Japan more than the U. S, It is
instructive, however, that both the Labor Ministry figures and the
U.S. Labor Department figures for 1977 and 1978 are close to each
other. This warrants a conclusion that in the late 1970s Japanese
labor productivity in manufacturing had attained rough parity with
that of the U.S. and that since Japan was consistently gaining on the
U.S. all the while, Japanese labor productivity in manufacturing may
well have surged past that of the U.S. at some time in the early 1980s.
The last two columns are based on a press report on a study done
at the Japanese Productivity Center. Until we see a full report on
the study, we cannot say much about the nature of these estimates.
The methodology is apparently the same as the previous estimates by
Yukizawa and the Labor Ministry. The proximity of the figure for
manufacturing to the other estimates strengthens the general conclu-
sion reached in the preceding paragraph. But, what is more important
is the fact that in Japan, labor productivity in manufacturing is far
higher than that in all industries. Thus, even if it is true that
Japan is as efficient sa the U.S. in manufacturing one cannot say that
the economy as a whole is similarly efficient. The relative labor
productivity in all industries is strikingly similar to the relative
per capita output for 1980 in the third column. This then gives rise
to a tentative conclusion regarding Japan's economic level vis-a-vis
the U.S. Although manufacturing efficiency is on a par with the U.S.
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or even rising above the U.S. , the general economic well-being of
Japan still lags behind that of the U.S. in the order of 30 to 40 per-
cent.
What makes manufacturing productivity surge ahead in that manner
leaving other industries far behind? This is an interesting question,
but a complex one on which we have no time to dwell. Compare this
pattern of uneven development in productivity with the United States'
inter-industrially rather balanced growth of productivity, and one
sense another potentially interesting question, which is: under which
pattern of inter-sectoral productivity growth, balanced or unbalanced,
is real per capita GNP likely to grow faster in the long run? Japan's
economic growth during the period of fast growth was supported by
growth-inducing resource allocation that the differential structure
had produced. This was the classic mechanism of shifting manpower
from low-growth, low-productivity industries to high-growth, high-
productivity industries. But that is precisely the problem for Japan
under the economic structure that has evolved since the early 1970s.
Manufacturing, the most dynamic high-productivity sector, has ceased
to absorb more manpower or, worse, has been shedding manpower con-
sistently over several years. The labor force that manufacturing eli-
minates or cannot absorb must be absorbed in lower-productivity sec-
tors. To generalize from this, the differential structure now alloca-
tes manpower from high-productivity to low-productivity sectors, while
the growth rate of total output in the manufacturing sector has slowed
down compared with earlier years, making the share of manufacturing in
GNP smaller. Allocative processes like these are bound to slow down
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the growth of overall productivity of the entire economy, making it lag
further behind manufacturing productivity.
The ultimate of manpower shedding in manufacturing is perfect auto-
mation or robotization which the Japanese actually proclaim as their
goal. This means that 25 percent or so of the Japanese labor force
which is still engaged in manufacturing has to be shifted to other low-
productivity sectors. If economic logic works as it should in the real
world, the greater availability of labor in these sectors should
encourage labor intensive processes and retard productivity growth. In
the meantime, the growth of manufacturing output is limited by the level
of income and the income elasticity of demand for industrial products
at home and abroad. Since personal incomes are earned only from the
low-productivity, low-growth sectors, the domestic demand for manufac-
turing output can grow only slowly. This results in an increasing
underutilization of robots; i.e., an increasing excess capacity in
manufacturing. The rate of economic growth may still be positive, but
whether it is even as high as the average growth rate of the 1970s is a
good question. The growth rate can be kept high if the foreign demand
for Japanese manufactures grows faster than the growth of labor produc-
tivity in Japanese manufacturing. An innovative foreign marketing of
the Japanese and a boundless good will of foreign consumers may for a
while sustain Japanese growth as in recent years. That it is too good
3
to last forever is the biggest worry of the Japanese.
This scenario is of course extreme, but it brings out one impor-
tant question. Are the Japanese really serious about shedding manu-
facturing labor? The Japanese experience of employment adjustment in
manufacturing may suggest at least a partial answer to this question.
-7-
Footnotes
For useful commentary on this and other methods of international
comparison of economic growth, see Hugh Patrick, "The Future of the
Japanese Economy: Output and Labor Productivity," Journal of Japanese
Studies , 3,2 (Summer 1977): 219-249. Unfortunately, almost exclusive
attention on the comparison of growth tends to neglect the comparison
of levels of income or productivity at a given point in time.
2
U.S. Department of Labor, Comparative Growth in Manufacturing
Productivity and Labor Costs in Selected Industrialized Countries
, pp.
18-19.
3
Japan's "export-led" or "export-biased" growth is the technical
heading under which this sort of discussion is carried out by econo-
mists. In recent years, many economists have reduced the role of
exports as a leader of Japanese growth, moderating as a consequence
their view of Japan's potential growth rates. An illuminating contri-
bution to the discussion is Shinkai Yoichi, "Patterns of American and
Japanese Growth and Productivity: A Japanese Perspective," Japan
Quarterly , 27, 3 (July-September 1980): 358-375.
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Notes to Table
•'U.S. Government, Economic Report of the President (January 1982);
Japanese Government, Economic White Paper .
^Laurits R. Christensen, Dianne Cummings , and Dale W. Jorgenson,
"Relative Productivity Levels, 1947-1973: An International
Comparison" (a working paper) (Social Systems Research Institute,
University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1980).
^Obtained by multiplying the Christensen-Cummings-Jorgenson figure
for 1970 by the Japan-U.S. ratio of per capita GNP growth rates between
1970 and 1980 calculated from data in sources noted in footnote 1.
4U.S. Department of Labor, Comparative Growth in Manufacturing
Productivity and Labor Costs in Selected Industrialized Countries (BLS
#1958, 1977), p. 18. The benchmark study of the U.S. -Japan ratio of
productivity is that by Kenzo Yukizawa for 1967. BLS adjusted for
other years, including the years shown here, by applying the BLS pro-
ductivity growth rates.
^Obtained by multiplying the BLS 1970 figures by the Japan/U.S.
productivity growth rate ratio between 1970 and 1979 based on Arthur
Neef and Patricia Capdevielle, "International Comparisons of
Productivity and Labor Costs," Monthly Labor Review
, 103, 12
(December 1980): 36.
"
6Ministry of Labor, Labor White Paper (1981).
Report of the Japan Productivity Center as announced in The Japan
Economic Journal (July 20, 1982).
Employment Adjustment in Japanese Manufacturing
In manufacturing as a whole, the reduction of output during the
1973-75 recession was accompanied by a sharp reduction of hours worked
per worker and a moderate decline in the number of workers employed.
With the increase in output after 1975, hours worked per worker also
increased, but the decline in employment continued for some more years
until 1979 (see Figure 1). The reversal in the movement of hours
worked per worker also seems to go counter to the long run trend of
working hours as may be discerned in Figure 1. Manufacturing
employment obviously peaked in 1971, suggesting a considerable discon-
tinuity in conditions surrounding employment between the 1960s and
1970s.
(Figure 1 about here)
With the worsening labor shortage during the late 1960s, the
rising demand for a better quality of life and a stronger pollution
control at the same time, and the re-valuation of the yen in the early
1970s, Japanese manufacturing firms were already faced with the need
for drastic cost-cutting measures even before the OPEC offensive of
1973 quadrupled the crude oil price. Added to the ongoing dif-
ficulties, the OPEC price revolution broke the back of Japanese
industry and brought about an unprecedented two-year fall in
industrial output. Drastic economy measures were called for, and
implemented, in the use of all resources, human as well as non-human.
However, human resource economy posed another threat of socio-
political nature arising from worker resistance to employment reduc-
tion and livelihood deterioration. The reduction of employment and
-2-
costs in Che interest of a leaner but more efficient work force there-
fore had to be pursued under the constraints of possible industrial
unrest that might be touched off by improper or sudden moves on the
part of the employers. A disaggregated view of how employment changed
in various industries and with respect to different worker and
employer types will be useful for shedding light on the kinds of mana-
gerial strategies followed for employment adjustment. As will be
shown below, there were predictable changes as well as a few
surprises.
Table 1 compares employment changes by sex and occupation between
1973 and 1979 across 20 branches of the manufacturing sector. It can
be seen that male employment decreased proportionately less than
female: 10 percent as against 16 percent. In addition, during the
same period, "managerial, clerical and technical" (non-production)
(Table 1 about here)
workers decreased proportionately less than "production" workers: 5
percent as against 15 percent. Furthermore, among the non-production
workers , males decreased by only two percent , while females decreased
by 14 percent. All this indicates that during the 1970s, Japanese
manufacturing work force became more masculine and more white-collar
oriented. But these quantitative and qualitative correlates of
decreasing employment are not peculiar to Japan. These are aspects of
commonly known economic behavior in any market economy. For example,
given the higher turnover of female labor than male, the use of attri-
tion without replacements as a means of employment reduction should
result in a greater reduction of female labor than male. In Japan as
-3-
elsewhere, white-collar and managerial employees enjoy greater
employment security than production workers. This can be explained by
human capital theory. Although blue-collar workers are said to be
just as permanent in principle as white-collar workers in Japan, there
obviously exists a difference between principle and practice.
The Japanese hiring freeze largely falls on mid-career workers and
post-"teinen" workers in the process of changing jobs and young
workers fresh out of school looking for their first jobs. One pecu-
liar thing happened in the late 1970s: despite the need for work
force retrenchment, the "teinen" rose in many firms under pressures
from the government and trade unions. "Teinen" is a unique Japanese
institution, often incorrectly translated as "retirement," which
amounts to a compulsory termination of employment at a given age with
a severance pay amounting to roughly three and a half years of base
pay. The age for terminantion is conventionally 55. In recent years,
somewhat more than a third of major Japanese corporations still set
their "teinen" at this age, while a little more than a fifth of them
set it at 60, making the distribution of "teinen" bimodal with smaller
fractions of firms setting it at odd ages before 55 and between 55 and
60. An average would be anywhere between 55 and 60, say 56.9 years as
of June 1979 (Katsuyo" rodo" tokei 1982, p. 127). At the same time,
more consistently with the economic trends, "horror stories" about
earlier selective "teinen" at age 40 or 45 also abound in the press
with reference to major firms' economy measures. In the midst of
these conflicting forces, the average age and length of service in
Japanese manufacturing have risen as illustrated by Table 2 below.
-4-
(Table 2 about here)
According to Table 2, the average age and the average length of
service rose less fast for workers with college education than for
those with less education. This suggests in part that the hiring
freeze was less severe on college graduates than on other school
leavers, which is consistent with the smaller reduction of employment
for the white-collar workers than for blue-collar as shown in Table 1.
An interesting point emerges from Table 2: the difference between the
average age and the average length of service suggests that many
workers must have spent varying amounts of time doing other things
than working for their current employers between leaving school and
finding jobs with the latter. (The difference between age and average
length of service at which a worker started to work with his current
employer.) For example, workers with a college education in Table 2
started to work for their current employers at age 25 or 26. If the
age of graduation from college is ideally 22, there are three or four
years on average unaccounted for. But here the discrepancy may not be
serious, because the workers in these statistics include older grad-
uates of prewar universities which took two more years for graduation
than the current system and, more importantly, because many college
students failed to advance to college straight from high school by
failing at the first entrance examinations. Considering these well-
known deviations from the ideal college graduation age of 22, the sta-
tistically inferred starting age of 25 or 26 can be considered fairly
consistent with the hypothesis that the jobs with their current
employers were the first jobs of the workers with college education.
-5-
3ut the statistical starting age in Table 2 seems too high for high
school or junior high school leavers to support the hypothesis that
they were hired by their current employers fresh out of schools. The
normal age for leaving high school is 18, although in practice if not
as extensive as in the case of college students, some high school stu-
dents failed at the first entrance examinations and graduated later
than at 18. Table 2 puts the average starting age with the curent
employers at 23 or 24 for high school leavers, 5 or 6 years higher
than the high school leaving age. This suggests that many workers
with high school education were not hired directly from schools—an
important modification of the lifetime employment system. For junior
high school leavers, the figures are even more devastating. The
discrepancy between the average starting age shown in Table 2 for
junior high and primary school leavers, 29 or 30, and the usual school
leaving age of 15 must be considered a strong violation of the life-
time employment system. Many workers with only compulsory education
must have had job experiences elsewhere before they were employed by
their current employers. Since these workers are the mainstay of
Japanese blue collar, it is odd that the lifetime employment system
which implies employment continuity with the same employer from school
to teinen does not apply to them.
However, one caveat may be noted and explored. The high average
age of the workers with junior high school or less education may be
due to post-teinen workers in their late 50s or 60s who can change
jobs frequently. Their presence pulls up the average age but pulls
down the average length of service. It may be that workers typically
-6-
enter permanent employment upon leaving school and stay with the same
employers until 55 or so, becoming mobile only after the primary life-
and-work cycle is completed. Data on length of service by age will
clarify this issue. Table 3 offers just such data. The workers in
the age bracket 50-54 are the most likely groups which the life-time
employment system would have recruited from school and kept employed
"for life" (until termination at 55 or so). And yet, these workers'
starting ages on the average are 29.7 for white collar and 35.8 for
blue collar.
(Table 3 about here)
From the above discussion of age and length of service, it is
clear that the meanings of "lifetime" employment and "retirement" in
Japan are not the same as in other countries. If "lifetime"
employment is only a glamorous alias for long job tenure, it is a
matter of degree rather than a fixed institution implying employment
security with the same employer over the entirety of working life from
school—leaving time to the time of retirement from work coinciding
with withdrawal from the labor force. The Japanese practice certainly
is not "lifetime" employment in the latter sense. In recent years, it
has become increasingly clear that Japanese job tenure on the whole
may even be inferior to American. For the U.S., Robert Hall offers a
convenient illustration of the proportion of long-service employees
(those having the same jobs for 20 or more years) by age bracket.
When Japanese data are put together with Hall's, Japanese job security
appears to be of a different kind from American.
-7-
Percent of
Percent of workers workers with lengths
with same jobs for . of service for 20 or
Age 20 or more years, U.S. more years, Japan
7 (ID
22 (31)
23 (32)
17 (24)
13 (18)
9 (13)
11 (14)
35-39 1
40-44 7
45-49 17
50-54 25
55-59 30
60-64 33
65+ 35
For Japan, the first column refers to all employees (male and
female) in all industries. The second column in parenthesis refers to
male employees in manufacturing. It is remarkable that job tenure
deteriorates after age 50 in Japan, while in the U.S. it monotonically
improves until 65 and beyond. For people younger than 50, Japan
offers much more employment stability than the U.S. Japanese
employers have good reasons for wanting to keep younger workers in
their employ for as long as possible. One good reason derives
directly from the human capital theory of training: i.e., people are
more trainable and can learn faster when they are young. From an eco-
nomic point of view, it is an impeccable logic that the employer keeps
workers as long as they learn new skills and adapt to the tech-
nological change undertaken at the pace chosen by the employer.
Another side of this logic is that workers are dismissed when they age
and fall behind the required pace of training and learning. Japanese
enterprises which are known to renew their plants and capital goods
-8-
much faster Chan firms in other countries have a special stake in the
quality of employees with reference to adaptability, trainability , and
versatility. When these qualities tend to diminish in a person's
lifetime is a question to which answers may vary. But a prudent view
would hold that 30-year olds can learn faster than 50-year olds. The
Japanese teinen for less competent employees are admirably suited to
Japan's national objective of rapid technological progress.
Manufacturing plants not only belong to different industries, but
also operate in different scales. When the employment change is
disaggregated on the basis of plant size, we encounter another
surprise: i.e., employment decreased drastically in the largest
plants, while it increased substantially in the smallest plants.
Table 4 compares employment trends in the smallest plants employing 29
or fewer persons with all other plants employing 30 or more persons.
With the 30-person plant as a divide, employment increased on the
smaller side but decreased on the larger side. Most of the increase
in employment took place in literally the smallest plants—those
employing nine or fewer persons. For contrast, Table 5 shows
employment change in the largest size class of plants employing 1,000
or more persons. While employment in manufacturing as a whole
decreased by 9 percent between 1973 and 1978, it decreased by more
than 20 percent in the largest plants. In the textile industry,
employment nearly disappeared in the largest plants, or such plants
nearly disappeared. Only in miscellaneous manufacturing, employment
increased in the largest plants. Since the largest plants are the
home of the Japanese employment system, the decline in the weight of
-9-
these plants in the employment structure of Japanese manufacturing has
serious implications for the "Japanese employment system."
(Tables 4, 5, and 6 about here)
A finer classification of establishments and employment by size
presented in Table 6 confirms the role of the 30-person plant as the
dividing line between employment reduction and expansion. This is
fascinating but hard to explain. Since plants with decreasing
employment move down to smaller size classes when size is measured by
employment, it is understandable that the largest size class (1,000+)
lost both plants and employment between 1973 and 1978; i.e., some of
the plants in this class in 1973 may have been reclassified in smaller
size classes in 1978. For the same reason, it is no mystery that the
smallest size class (0-9) was the net gainer of employment, because no
plants could become smaller than that size class. But in the inter-
mediate size classes, there should have been plants joining them from
above by becoming smaller as well as plants moving out of them into
still smaller classes. The mystery is why joiners and leavers did not
cancel each other out. In addition, even though economic conditions
were generally poor during the period under consideration, there
should have been some growing firms. To the extent, that they crossed
the size boundaries upward, how the number of firms and that of their
employees in a given intermediate size class would change was further
complicated. Thus it is rather strange that a clear dividing line
like the 30-person plant should have emerged. Furthermore, there was
a net gain in the number of plants together with a net loss in total
employment. The new plants were in the smallest size classes, but it
-10-
is not entirely clear how these small plants came into being just at
the time when economic difficulties were forcing the established
plants to cut back employment. It is possible that some of the former
employees of the established plants struck out on their own with or
without the help of their former employers. The mushrooming of small
entrepreneurs during a difficult period smacks of the "disguided
unemployment." Something to this effect is occasionally mentioned in
Japanese publications. However, the usual attributes of "disguised
unemployent , " like zero or etremely low productivity, must be rejected
as unreal or untrue in the case of Japanese small-scale industry,
because one observes a healthy growth of labor productivity in
Japanese manufacturing despite the shifting weight of employment to
3
smaller plants.
Japanese manufacturing is highly innovative and productive. Its
output, technology and productivity constitute a serious challenge to
world manufacturing. And yet, Japanese manufacturing is still run in
a style which accords a significant role to small and medium-sized
plants. In terms of employment, the average plant size even decreased
during the 1970s, from 16.9 persons per plant in 1973 to 14.6 persons
per plant in 1978 (Table 5). The employment share of larger plants
declined at the same time. One might even feel a touch of "Small is
Beautiful." This peculiarity of Japanese industrial structure
suggests that Japanese industrialization may have been supported by a
different combination of markets, industrial organization and tech-
nological choice from the Western syndrome of expanding markets, eco-
nomies of scale, and oligopolization. A statistical study of manu-
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facturing in Britain, Germany and the United States at the National
Institute of Economic and Social Research, England lays stress on the
size of plant as a major factor in labor productivity. When the
median size is defined as "that above (or below) which half the number
of employees in an industry are engaged," it results in 440 for Britain
4
(1973), 410 for Germany (1970), and 380 for the U.S. (1972). By a
similar calculation, the Japanese median plant size in 1975 comes to
149. When all the employed persons are taken into account, that is,
including not only employees but also working proprietors and their
working family members, the median size drops to 75. It is somewhat
startling that in a country where manufacturing labor productivity is
higher than in Britain and Germany and matches that of the U.S., a half
of manufacturing employment is found in plants manned by 75 or fewer
persons. The role of size as a source of higher labor productivity
via economies of scale obviously faces a Japanese challenge.
We now return to a potential puzzle implicit in the earlier data
(Figure 1) which showed a rise in working hours coupled with a con-
tinued decline in employment after 1975. The need for reducing the
labor input apparently ended in that year and it appears that more
workers could have been retained in employment if working hours had
not been increased. A disaggregated view of the relationship between
rising hours of work and declining employment is presented in Table 7.
(Table 7 about here)
In all two-digit industries, working hours began to increase in 1974
or 1975 (with one exception in 1976). But in a great majority of
these industries, employment continued to decrease. The question is
why the Japanese firms met the rising demand for labor induced by the
-12-
rising level of output by reducing employment and making remaining
employees work, longer hours. A partial answer to that question is
that work sharing reducing hours of work may, beyond a point, demora-
lize the work force and that compared with this kind of work force, a
leaner work force with a full work load may produce larger and better
output because of improved team spirit and team efficiency. This is
generally known as shosu sei'ei shugi , a principle emphasizing a
smaller work force composed of better and abler workers.
Shosu sei'ei shugi would imply that the same aggregate labor hours
(working hours times the number of workers) would be more productive
when turned out by a smaller number of workers working an optimum
number of hours each. It is possible that at the trough of the
post-OPEC recession, firms had too many workers on the payroll each
working fewer than desirable hours. Not only in Figure 1, but also
on the basis of cross-industry comparison of employment and hours
worked, employment change is found to be negatively correlated with
hours worked; i.e., in industries where hours worked increased (or
decreased), employment decreased (or increased). Since the recovery
affected different industries differently, it is desirable to adjust
for the different rates of output expansion in order to make the
correlation between hours and employment purer. Thus a hypothesis to
be tested is: output change being the same (proxy for "other things
being the same"), employment should have decreased more (or less) in
industries in which hours worked increased more (or less). A cross-
industry multiple regression can then be written in the form:
(1) E = a + b H + b
?
X
-13-
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where E, H, and X are rates of change in employment, hours worked per
worker, and industry output. The coefficient b should be negative,
while b should be positive. This equation can be fitted by data in
Table 7 as follows:
(2) E = -2.15 - 2.04 H + 0.38 X Adjusted R = 0.3751
(1.96) (3.02) (3.21)
(Table 7 about here)
The fit is very good, and the coefficients for H and X in the
equation are highly significant (at 1 percent level) as indicated by
the high t-values in the parentheses. The constant term also easily
passes a significance test at 10 percent. The large, negative and
highly significant coefficient for H (-2.04) says that for every 1
percent increase in working hours, industries got rid of more than 2
percent of employees. This may imply that additional hours worked by
employees on the payroll are more productive than the same number of
hours lost by the departure of some employees. For example, in a
hypothetical situation where a plant employs 100 workers, each working
40 hours a week, additional 40 hours of work generated from 99 workers
(1 percent increase in aggregate hours worked) would enable the plant
to get rid of two workers (2 percent of employees). This should be an
irresistible temptation to any employer interested in raising labor
productivity per hour. In many manufacturing industries, working
hours actually averaged at about 40 hours a week in 197 5, but Japanese
employers and workers obviously considered that much of working hours
too low to be desirable. In order to ensure to each employee a
desirable level of working hours, then, Japanese industries had to
-14-
reduce employment after 1975. One might also recall in this connec-
tion that American and European complaints about the "workaholic"
Japanese became louder during this period. Despite the rising output
which could have been translated into more employment, Japanese unions
after 1975 offered surprisingly little resistance to the on-going
substitution of hours for employment. Unions were satisfied if
appropriate conditions like generous severance pay were offered to the
terminated employees. In order to bring about this kind of outcome
favorable to themselves, employers had to keep insisting—and they
apparently succeeded in making everyone believe—that they were still
overloaded with redundant labor.
A careful econometric analysis done at the Economic Planning
Agency shows that excess labor supply (the difference between the
number of workers firms had in their employ and the number they con-
sidered justified by the level of output and that of regular working
hours) had disappeared in Japanese manufacturing by mid-1975. This
analysis treats all the working hours as homogeneous, whereas Equation
2 above suggests that in and after 1975, additional hours worked by
remaining employees were more productive than the same number of hours
that the departing employees would have supplied. It appears, then,
that the total number of hours from 100 workers at X hours each (100X)
is less productive than the same number of hours worked by 80 workers
at 5/4 of X hours each (still 100X). Why a leaner work force can be
Qore efficient than a fatter work force for the same aggregate number
of hours cannot be explained without discarding the assumption that an
hour of work is an hour of work regardless of who puts it in or when.
A morale factor which can be generated more easily in a leaner work
-15-
force can be "labor-augmenting" in the sense that an hour of work com-
bined with high morale is more productive than an hour of demoralized
work. Japanese employers obviously took advantage of the post-OPEC
economic crisis for inspiring workers with the need for renewed dedi-
cation and discipline. Government helped them in this campaign.
Those workers who had to lose jobs or forego opportunities in manufac-
turing probably did so in the belief that their loss of jobs or oppor-
tunities was in the interest of more efficient Japanese industry.
Conclusion
There is something extraordinary in the concentration of Japanese
efforts to improve labor productivity in manufacturing with heavy em-
phasis on the elimination of employment, apparently unmindful of pro-
ductivity in all other sectors. What labor shedding in manufacturing
amounts to , then, is a shift of the burden of employment creation to
other sectors. As a consequence these sectors suffer from downward
pressure on their productivity growth. This conceivable negative inter-
dependence between manufacturing and non-manufacturing has so far es-
caped observers' serious attention. But there is no doubt that it is
a subject requiring urgent and careful analysis. Aware of this need,
this paper examines the nature of employment adjustment in manufactur-
ing and suggests corrections with respect to what must now be consid-
ered misconceptions of Japanese employment practices like lifetime
employment.
-16-
Footnotes
Robert E. Hall, "The Importance of Lifetime Jobs in the U.S.
Economy," American Economic Review , 72, 4 (September 1982): 717.
The figures are based on the Current Population Survey . "A job is
defined as continuous employment with the same employer, possibly in
different occupations," the author says.
2
Calculated from Ministry of Labor, Yearbook of Labor Statistics
,
1979, pp. 176-192.
3
An illuminating discussion of size differences in employment
adjustment is Eiko Shinotsuka, "Kigyo kibobetsu ni mita saikin no koyo
chosei" (Employment Adjustment by Size of Enterprise), Nihon Rodo
Kyokai Zasshi (The Journal of the Japan Institute of Labor) (February
1979): 2-13.
4
S. J. Prais et al., Productivity and Industrial Structure (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 9-10.
Since the OPEC shock, there has been a sort of fixation on the
central importance of the labor costs among Japanese enterprises, as
discovered by a survey undertaken by MITI. See MITI, Nihonteki koyo
kanko no yuku'e (Whither Japanese Employment Institutions?) (Tokyo:
Sangyo Noritsu Daigaku Press, 1981).
Haruo Shimade et al. , Rodo shijo kiko no kenkyu (Studies in the
Labor Market Mechanism) (EPA Research Series No. 37) (Tokyo, 1981),
pp. 311-322, 384-395.
When an employee's efficiency per day is a nonlinear function of
the hours of work, the profit-maximizing employer must determine the
optimum number of hours each worker should work per day and the opti-
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mum number of workers. That is, hours per worker and employment
become two independent variables. The analytical problem here is for-
mally similar to the theory of underemployment presented by Harvey
Leibenstein a generation ago: Harvey Leibenstein, Economic Backward-
ness and Economic Growth (New York: Wiley, 1957), Chapter 6. For a
further exploration of puzzles in the determination of optimum hours
and optimum employment by a profit-maximizing entrepreneur, see Koji
Taira, "Surplus Labor, Undernourishment, and Labor Market Rationality
in LDC Agriculture: The Leibenstein Model," Keizai Kenkyu (Economic
Review), 21, 4 (October 1970): 312-322.
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Table 1. Ratio of Employment in 1979 to that in 1973 by
Industry, Occupation and Sex: Japanese Manufacturing
Managerial, clerical
All Workers Production Workers and technical worker
Industry Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
Total .88 .90 .84 .85 .86 .84 .95 .98 .86
18/19 1.11 1.13 1.08 1.09 1.11 1.01 1.15 1.18 1.09
20 .65 .74 .59 .62 .71 .57 .79 .80 .78
21 1.11 1.13 1.10 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.06 1.14 1.00
22 .69 .73 .61 .66 .71 .57 .82 .81 .90
23 .89 .90 .87 .85 .86 .86 1.00 1.00 1.00
24 .91 .97 .75 .90 .97 .72 .93 .95 .93
25 .94 .96 .85 .95 .97 .88 .94 .97 .85
26 .86 .92 .70 .82 .89 .65 .89 .95 .74
27 .76 .91 .86 .96 .96 1.00 .88 .89 1.00
28 .81 .87 .71 .81 .88 .70 .81 .87 .80
29 1.03 .94 1.23 1.00 .92 1.27 1.40 1.25 2.00
30 .91 .94 .84 .87 .90 .79 1.07 1.08 1.05
31 .84 .85 .71 .83 .85 .63 .85 .88 .77
32 .87 .91 .74 .88 .90 .74 .87 .93 .73
33 .82 .83 .83 .81 .1 .82 .86 .88 .84
34 .83 .83 .82 .77 .77 .78 .93 .96 .86
35 .93 .99 .85 .90 .96 .85 .98 1.02 .83
36 .84 .84 .83 .80 .80 .88 .93 .97 .80
37 1.02 1.04 1.00 .99 .97 1.00 1.12 1.16 1.00
38/39 1.03 1.02 1.06 .98 .92 1.08 1.17 1.22 1.04
Sources: Ministry of Labor, Year Book of Labour Statistics, 1973, 1979.
Notes Co Table 1
18/19: Food and kindred products, tobacco manufacturing;
20: Textile mill products;
21: Apparel and other finished products made from fabrics and similar
materials;
22: Lumber and wood products;
23: Furniture and fixtures;
24: Pulp, paper and paper worked products;
25: Publishing, printing and allied industries;
26: Chemical and allied products;
27: Petroleum and coal products;
28: Rubber products;
29: Leather and leather products;
30: Ceramic, stone and clay products;
31: Iron and steel;
32: Non-ferrous metal products;
33: Fabricated and metal products;
34: Machinery;
35: Electrical machinery;
36: Transportation and equipment;
37: Precision machinery;
38/39: Miscellaneous manufacturing industries.
Table 2: The Average and Length of Service For Male Employees
in Japanese Industry by Level of Education, 1973 and
1979. (in years)
All Industries Manufacturing
1973 1979 Change 1973 1979 Change
University graduates
Age 34.0 34.4 -K).4 33.7 35.0 +1.3
Length of service 8.4 8.9 -KD.
5
8.5 9.9 +1.4
Difference 25.6 25.5 25.2 25.1
High school graduates
Age 32.4 34.7 +2.3 31.6 34.3 +2.7
Length of service 8.5 9.9 +1.4 8.5 10.8 +2.3
Difference 23.9 24.8 23.1 23.5
Junior high and primary
school leavers
Age 39.8 42.5 +2.7 38.9 41.8 +2.9
Length of service 10.6 11.6 +1.0 11.1 13.2 +2.1
Difference 29.2 30.9 27.8 28.6
Sources : Japan Productivity Center, Katsuyo rodo tokei (Practical Labor
Statistics), 1975 and 1981. _The original data_sources are
Ministry of Labor, Chingin kozo kihon tokei chosa (popularly
known as "Wage Census").
Table 3. Average ages and lengths of service of male manufacturing
workers by occupation, 1979
All workers White collar Blue collar
Average Average Average
Average length of Average length of Average length of
Age age service age service age age
All ages 37.6 11.7 37.7 13.0 37.5 10.9
30-34 32.3 10.0 32.5 9.9 32.3 10.2
35-39 37.4 10.0 37.4 14.3 37.5 12.5
40-44 42.5 15.2 42.4 17.4 42.5 13.8
45-49 47.4 17.1 47.3 20.4 47.4 15.3
50-54 52.4 18.7 52.4 22.7 52.3 16.6
55-59 57.2 15.7 57.1 19.0 57.2 14.1
60-64 62.3 11.2 62.3 12.8 62.3 10.5
65+ 68.8 12.3 69.0 13.9 68.7 11.6
Sources: Ministry of Labor, Yearbook of Labor Statistics , 1979,
pp. 162-164. The original sources are the "Wage Censuses.'
Table 4. Employed Persons in Manufacturing Size of Establishment
1970-1978: Absolute Numbers in Indices
Year Total
Establishments
employing 0-9
sersons
Establishments
employing 10-19
persons
Establishments
employing 20-29
persons
Establishments
employing 30+
persons
(Absolute number , in thousands)
1970 11,679 1,910 1,262 647 7,862
1971 11,463 1,886 1,216 636 7,726
1972 11,783 2,056 1,315 669 7,743
1973 11,961 2,079 1,325 683 7,874
1974 11,486 2,035 1,255 675 7,521
1975 11,296 2,152 1,283 690 7,171
1976 11,173 2,112 1,158 840 7,064
1977 10,874 2,078 1,120 848 6,828
1978 10,890 2,178 1,151 886 6,675
(Index, 1970 = 100)
1970 100 100 100 100 100
1971 98.2 98.7 96.4 98. 3 98.3
1972 100.9 107.6 104.2 103. 4 98.5
1973 102.4 108.8 105.0 105. 6 100.2
1974 98.3 106.5 100.3 104. 3 95.7
1975 96.7 112.7 101.7 106. 6 91.2
1976 95.7 110.6 91.8 129. 8 89.9
1977 93.1 108.8 88.7 131.,1 86.9
1978 93.2 114.0 91.2 136. 9 84.9
Sources: MIT I , Census of Manfacturers.
Table 5. Employment in Manufacturing As A Whole and In Establishments
Employing 1,000 Persons or More, by Industry, in 1973 and 1978
(in 000s of persons)
Establishments employing
Manufacturing as a Whole 1,000 or more persons
1973 1978 '78/73Industrv 1973 1978 *78/*73
Total 11,961 10,890 0.91
18/19 1,153 1,165 1.01
20 1,167 867 0.74
21 497 547 1.10
22 510 415 0.81
23 317 306 0.96
24 333 300 0.90
25 486 505 1.04
26 466 415 0.89
27 44 45 1.02
28 170 157 0.92
29 86 94 1.09
30 585 533 0.91
31 528 449 0.85
32 228 191 0.84
33 910 829 0.91
34 1,193 1,054 0.88
35 1,399 1,240 0.89
36 985 893 0.91
37 261 258 0.99
38 2 1.3 0.65
39 642 627 0.98
1,935 1,512 0.78
19 16 0.84
58 4 0.07
5 x
x 8
9 6 0.67
23 21 0.91
57 43 0.75
141 102 0.72
x x
49 36 0.73
x 2
34 23 0.68
235 207 0.88
62 42 0.68
17 9 0.53
234 202 0.86
433 341 0.79
495 403 0.81
50 34 0.68
x x
17 22 1.29
Sources: MITI, Census of Manufactures
,
1973 and 1978. "x" indicates that
there are too few establishments (one or two) to protect them
against identification if the required figures are published.
Table 6: The Number of Establishments and the
by Size of Establishment in Japanese
Number of Employed Persons
Manufacturing, 1973 and 197!
Size class by
number of employed
persons
Establishments
(in number of units)
1973 1978 Change
527,470 569,866 +42,396
Employment
(in 000s of perso
1973 1978 Ch
2,079 2,178 +
ns)
ange
9 or fewer 99
10-19 93,461 83,689 - 9,772 1,325 1,152 - 173
20-29 27,763 36,629 + 8,866 683 885 + 202
30-49 25,376 22,265 - 3,111 981 856 - 125
50-99 18,302 18,164 138 1,277 1,245 - 32
100-199 8,959 7,905 - 1,054 1,231 1,085 - 146
200-299 2,796 2,326 470 677 566 - 111
300-499 2,043 1,694 349 781 650 - 131
500-999 1,433 1,126 307 991 762 - 229
1,000+ 844 673 171 1,935 1,512 - 423
Total 708,447 744,337 +35,890 11,961 10,890 -1 ,071
Per establishment _ _ — 16.9 14.6
Sources: MITI, Census of Manufactures, 1973 and 1978.
Table 7. The Rates of Change in Employment, Hours Worked and Output in
Manufacturing Industries, from the Trough of the Recession to
1978.
Average annual Average annual Average annual
rate of change rate of change rate of change
Industry in employment in hours worked in output
,
code-*- 1975 to 19792 1975 to 19792 1975 to 19783
(%) (%) <%)
18/19 2.03 .28 4.4
20 -5.16 1.02 3.3
21 .52 .69 10.2
22 -5.75 2.12 6.4
23 - .63 1.19 8.3
24 -2.06 1.77 8.4
25 -1.40 .70 8.6
26 -2.52 .77 11.0
27 -1.93 .06 1.0
28 -1.85 1.73 9.0
29 - .15 .48 10.0
30 -1.40 1.37 6.8
31 -4.58 1.38 8.8
32 -1.93 2.45 16.8
33 -2.06 2.21 7.0
34 -3.03 2.16 6.8
35 1.35 2.11 18.0
36 -3.73 1.64 8.5
37 1.85 1.46 13.2
38/39 2.15 .91 10.0
Notes to Table 7
See Table 1.
"The negative rates of increase are calculated as follows:
(The value of X in 1979) - (The value of X in 1975) x
(1-r)"* where r is the rate of decrease.
The positive rates of increase are calculated as follows:
(The value of X in 1979) = (The value of X in 1975) x
(1+R)^ where R is the rate of increase.
Sources: Ministry of Labor, Yearbook of Labor Statistics , 1975
and 1979. The data refer to manufacturing establishments
employing 30 or more regular workers.
Calculated from data on values added in various industries
deflated by wholesale price indices specific to their products.
Sources: MITI, Census of Manufactures, 1978.
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